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I Introduction
This article draws insights from legal pluralism to
propose alternative ways to view property rights
and resource users' relationships with natural
resources. Such an approach allows for flexible
adaptation to changes and uncertainty, which we
illustrate through the case of water. Of the
institutions that affect how people interact with
natural resources, none are more influential than
property rights. Property rights not only affect who
may use which resource and in what ways, but also
shape the incentives people have for investing in
and sustaining the resource base over time. Yet
approaches to understanding property rights have
too often regarded them as unitary and fixed,
rather than diverse and changing. Reflecting these
conceptions, policymakers have often sought to
consolidate rights through statutory law in the
name of providing tenure security or in the quest
for efficiency through 'well-defined' property
rights.
However, such a conception of property rights is
flawed on two counts. First, it does not reflect
reality because it ignores the many different
bundles of property rights that exist, and the
multiple bases for claiming property rights.
Second, even if a single, unchanging form of
property rights were possible, it would not be well
adapted to the uncertainties that are frequently
encountered in dealing with natural resources.
In this article we argue that, rather than seeking a
single definition of property rights, it is better to
recognise the multiple and often overlapping bases
for claims, and to regard property rights and the
uses of resources as negotiated outcomes. Not only
does this lead to a more accurate understanding of
the situation that resource users face, but it allows
greater flexibility to adapt to changes and uncert-
ainty, as the examples from water rights
demonstrate.
2 Legal PuraIism and Property
Rights
To go beyond the limitations of many conventional
treatments of property rights, it is useful to turn
our analysis upside down. Instead of beginning
with statutory law, legal anthropologists argue for
starting with the perspective of people's experience
with access and control, in which individuals draw
upon a range of strategies for claiming and
obtaining resources. From this vantage point, it is
clear that multiple legal and normative frameworks
coexist.
In most social settings more than one legal system
(defined broadly) becomes relevant. For many
social scientists, law is not limited to state law but
is understood very broadly, at least by legal
anthropologists, as cognitive and normative orders
generated and maintained in a social field.' It is
thus possible to have various kinds of law such as
state law, religious law, customary law, donor law
and local law. The coexistence and interaction of
multiple legal orders within a social setting or
domain of social life is called legal pluralism.2 In
such situations individuals can make use of more
than one law to rationalise and legitimise their
claims, decisions or behaviour. The claimants or
disputants use different normative repertoires in
different contexts or forums depending on which
law or interpretation of law they believe is most
likely to support their claims, a process known as
forum shopping (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984).
The different normative and cognitive orders may
be sharply distinguished in some contexts, as, for
example, in the courts, but they are less sharply
distinguished in the everyday life of local
communities. At the local level we find a mixture of
several normative orders, which are based on long
historical tradition, e.g. customary law, new forms
of self-regulation, elements of old and new state
laws, donor laws, etc. This whole mixture of norms
and rules that are expressed and used at the local
level is called local law (E and K. von Benda-
Beckmann and Spiertz 1997).
Applying legal pluralism to an examination of the
use of resources, it is important to recall that the
concept of property rights is an 'umbrella concept',
which includes several types of rights to different
forms and uses of resources (E and K. von Benda-
Beckmann and Spiertz 1996: 80). These various
kinds of rights may be grouped into two broad
categories of rights, namely rights to use and rights
to regulate, control and make decisions (or in
short, decision-making rights) (E and K. von
Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz. 1997; Schlager and
Ostrom 1992),
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Following Wiber's (1992) approach, property
rights may be defined as claims to use or control
resources by an individual or group that are
recognised as legitimate by a larger collectivity and
that are protected by law.4 Individuals or groups
(users, community, state, etc.) may assert claims of
various kinds over resources. It is not sufficient to
assert claims to the resource; unless claims are
accepted by a larger collectivity than the claimants
they are not considered legitimate. This becomes
clear when there are conflicting claims. Rights are
only as strong as the institi.ition or collectivity that
stands behind them. The state is one important
legitimating institution, but it is not the only one,
and in many cases it may not be as relevant as a
village, an ethnic community or a users' group.
Rules and laws themselves are subject to
negotiation, reinterpretation and change. The way
in which people call upon different legal orders,
and the negotiation between them, provides some
of this dynamism. Nor is it only that local law
adapts to be consistent with statutory law; the latter
also changes, taking into account a range of
religious, customary and other types of law. Thus,
different legal orders should not be seen as isolated
from one another, but as interacting, influencing
each other and 'mutually constitutive' (Guillet
1998).
Principles, rules or laws concerning property rights
do not reflect actual practice or actual
configuration of property rights' relations. It is
important to differentiate between 'the legal
construction of rights from the actual social
relationships that connect concrete right holding
individuals, groups and associations with concrete
and demarcated resources' (E and K. von Benda-
Beckmann and Spiertz 1997: 226). Elsewhere (F
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2000), these are
referred to as categorical and concretised rights,
corresponding to general rights in principle, and
specific rights that an individual can draw upon. It
is at the level of the actual social relationship
concerning various forms of property that other
types of rights and social relationships become very
significant, e.g. rights to land, to residence in a
village or membership in a community Power
relationships are also very important for they often
determine the distribution and actualisation of
rights. The actual rights relationships depend on
specific contexts and are a product of locality,
history, changes in resource flow, ecology and
social relationships, negotiation and dispute. Laws
are but one resource used in the strategies of
individuals and groups to acquire, establish,
protect and continue their rights.
3 Legal Pluralism and Uncertainty
As Mehta et al. (1999) argue, natural resources
management is shaped increasingly by different
kinds of uncertainties (see below). Legal pluralism
has particular applicability to contexts of ecological
or livelihood uncertainties (Mehta et al. 1999), as
well as social and political uncertainties and
changes. At the same time, legal pluralism can
generate or increase knowledge uncertainties. The
linkages between pluralism in property rights and
different types of uncertainty include:
Ecological uncertainties. Unpredictable fluct-
uations in the natural resource base call for
different sets of rules to deal with different
situations. Who is allowed to use how much water
or grazing land will differ during a drought
compared to a period of bountiful rainfall. Legal
pluralism expands the repertoires available to
people to apply in different situations. In part-
icular, people who are experiencing hardship due
to drought or other ecological fluctuations may
appeal to a variety of norms regarding sharing and
meeting basic human needs, instead of rules that
give some the rights to exclude others during
'normal' times (Ngaido and Kirk 2001; Sutawan
2000). Such adaptations increase the livelihood
security of households that depend on fluctuating
natural resources.
Livelihood uncertainties. Changes in uses and
users of natural resources often evoke different
bases for claims on a resource. As in the case of
ecological uncertainties, legal pluralism expands
the bases of claims on the resource and allows for
dynamic adaptation to new circumstances. For
example, locally defined or 'customary' rights to
forest or fishing resources may be sufficient to deal
with subsistence-level exploitation of the resource,
but not to deal with outside users, new techn-
ologies that allow for more efficient exploitation of
the resource or market penetration that changes
the value of the resources. In these cases national or
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even international law may be called upon to
define and enforce rights and limits on resource
exploitation.
Livelihood uncertainties can result from the change
in customary users, as when men migrate to cities
and leave women to take over all farming activities.
In such cases, customary rules that limit women's
participation in management bodies limit the
control rights of female-headed households.
However, new rules supported by the state,
external donors or non-governmental organis-
ations (NGOs) may call for more female involve-
ment, and hence provide a basis for stronger claims
by women farmers.
Users may also acknowledge essential livelihood
uses as a basis for claiming resources, even though
formal rules prohibit such claims. In this context,
as in many others, people consider natural
resources not only as commodities but also as
objects that have symbolic (including prestige and
religious), social security and social exchange
aspects.'
Social and political uncertainty. Influxes of new
migrants, changes in regimes, and other social and
political upheavals create uncertainties that are at
least as profound as ecological and livelihood
uncertainties. Legal pluralism can both emerge
from such conditions and help people cope with
these uncertainties. Smucker, White and Bannister
(forthcoming) relate how locally defined property
rights to land, enforced by local recognition, offer
peasants in Haiti defence against a predatory state.
Unruh (forthcoming) provides a more extreme
example from post-war Mozambique, where
massive displacement and resettlement of people
from different areas disrupted many customary
forms of property rights, but the state also lacked
the capacity to define or arbitrate property rights.
In this situation, multiple rules of evidence were
employed to settle conflicts.
Knowledge uncertainty. While legal pluralism can
provide a means of coping with ecological,
livelihood, social and political uncertainty, it also
exacerbates knowledge uncertainty No one will
know all of the pertinent or possibly applicable
legal frameworks, and what provisions they have
regarding property rights. Instead, legal knowledge
is partial and fragmented. The result is that
resource users may act in ignorance of some
definitions of property rights.
The other form of knowledge uncertainty that legal
pluralism creates or enhances is the knowledge of
what other people will do. Institutional economists
point out that the great advantage of institutions
lies in the way they allow people to predict the
behaviour of others. In common property theory
this predictability helps provide assurance that if
one abides by the rules governing use of a resource,
others will too, thereby overcoming the fear of free
riders and the 'tragedy of the commons'. But if
multiple legal frameworks can be applied at the
same time, and others may be abiding by different
laws and definitions of property rights, then that
assurance is eroded. These factors often lead
economists interested in increasing efficiency, as
well as policymakers and analysts interested in
sustainable natural resource management, to seek
to reduce pluralism and consolidate all under a
unitary 'rule of [state] law'.
lt would be wrong to assume that knowledge
uncertainties, inherent in legal pluralism, are
necessarily major obstacles to equitable and
sustainable natural resource management.
Certainly the flexibility that legal pluralism allows
provides an important coping strategy to deal with
environmental, livelihood, and social and political
uncertainty Consolidating all property rights
under statutory law, even if it were possible, would
sacrifice adaptability to changing circumstances.
Statutory law can even become a major source of
livelihood uncertainty, especially to those who have
less money, education, connections, or other
resources to give them access to the state legal
mechanisms. Recognising diverse sources of
property rights is more equitable because it offers
most parties some basis for a claim on the resource.
Furthermore, legal pluralism distributes know-
ledge uncertainties among the different stake-
holders, so that no one has a monopoly on
knowledge, nor is anyone likely to be totally
without some notion of property rights.
What legal pluralism does call for is much more
attention to negotiation processes. Given the
heterogeneous and hierarchical nature of local
communities, negotiation means that the powerful
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can often establish stronger rights. Women, mem-
bers of lower classes or otherwise disadvantaged
groups often lack the knowledge and bargaining
power needed to actualise their rights. Establishing
effective platforms for negotïation is critical for
effective natural resource management. For equity
in distribution of concretised property rights,
external intervention may be needed to level the
playing field. This entails either strengthening the
negotiating ability of disadvantaged groups or
expanding the repertoire of claims they can make
on a resource (e.g. by passing statutory laws giving
women more claims to property). Without effective
negotiating forums, conflicts can escalate, but with
effective means of negotiating, various stakeholders
can adapt to changing conditions. The discussion
of water rights in the following section illustrates
these points.
4 Examples from Water Rights
In many parts of the world, water rights are
dynamic, flexible and subject to frequent negot-
iations (see Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2000; R.
Pradhan et al. 1997; R. Pradhan and F and K. von
Benda-Beckmann 2000). This is because water
rights, like rights to natural resources in general,
are embedded in social, political and economic
relationships and are often closely tied to other
rights. Changes in any of these relationships and
rights affect property rights to natural resources.
However, water rights are perhaps more dynamic,
flexible, and subject to continued negotiation than
other natural resources because of the character-
istics of water as a resource. Water is a mobile, fluid
and fugitive resource, with a great deal of inherent
uncertainty regarding its quantity and location.
Uncertainty of water availability is often com-
pounded by floods and landslides, which may
change river courses and destroy intake structures,
making it impossible to convey water to the
locations at the periods when it is needed. But
there is demand and need for specific quantities of
water at specific times and locations, especially for
irrigation and domestic water uses.
Capturing and conveying water to the locations
where it is to be used requires collective effort, both
to appropriate and convey water and to make and
enforce rules for appropriation, allocation and
distribution. There are often multiple users and
uses of the same water source, with different
categories of rights and rights holders to water as it
flows along its course and is captured and conveyed
to different locations. For example, the state may
claim ownership and control rights to a river
throughout its course, while riparian communities
may claim control and use rights to the river water
as it flows past their localities. The farmers who
construct and operate irrigation infrastructures will
claim ownership, control and use rights to the
water in their canals. Yet others may have tolerated
access and limited use rights to water in the canals
for irrigation as well as non-irrigation uses, such as
for watering livestock, washing clothes and
traditional mills (Meinzen-Dick and Bakker 2000;
R. Pradhan and U. Pradhan 2000).
The demand for water and the change in the uses
of water have increased with the rapid growth of
population and lifestyles, urbanisation and
industrialisation. Although irrigation is still the
largest sector of water consumption worldwide,
municipal and industrial uses are growing as much
as ten times faster. As a consequence, there has
been a tremendous increase in competition and
conflict over water between the state and water-
resource-based companies on the one hand and
local communities on the other, between different
local communities and between members of the
same local communities.
Attempts by. government agencies to regulate water
use by different users by means of state law have
often not succeeded in decreasing conflicts, and
may in fact have led to uncertainty about water
rights for the traditional rights holders. This is
because elites control the decision-making
processes that legitimise the rules for allocation and
distribution of water (Adhikari and Pradhan 2000).
However, programmes and alliances can help
disadvantaged groups have a stronger negotiating
position. Especially important in this regard are
changes in state law or bureaucratic procedures,
legal literacy campaigns, public interest law firms,
and community organising efforts (often sponsored
by a variety of NGOs). The following examples
show the complexity and dynamism of water rights
in different types of situations. While most are
drawn from irrigation in South Asia, similar
principles are to be found in many contexts, if we
look beyond simple statutory explanations.
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Dry seasons and years. In times of drought and
water scarcity, the rules applied during normal
periods or periods of water abundance are often
negotiated. Examples include the temporary
reallocation of land in the bethma system in Sri
Lanka (Spiertz and de Jong 1992), 'borrowing' or
rearrangement of water flows between Balinese
suba Izs, and farmers in some villages in Nepal being
allowed to 'steal' water or given tolerated access
during drought seasons (K. C. Durga and R.
Pradhan 1997; R. Pradhan and U. Pradhan 2000).
In these circumstances, norms that appeal to
sentiments of equity, community ties, religion and
so on come into play
Expanding systems. In many parts of the world,
especially in 'developing countries' heavily
dependent on agriculture, a lot of money has been
spent by donor agencies and national governments
to expand irrigated agriculture, either by
constructing new irrigation systems or more often
by expansion of existing systems. Expansion of
existing systems with government or donor funds
leads to negotiations between old and new rights
holders and claimants. While original rights
holders may claim rights over the irrigation system
and water by virtue of their own (or their
ancestors') investment in the system, newcomers
claim rights to the enlarged system and water by
virtue of project investment and government
grants. Whose claims will be accepted or what kind
of water rights arrangements will be effected
depends on negotiation between the rival claimants
and their manifold social, political and economic
relationships, as well as other norms brought into
play (Brewer 2000; F and K. von Benda-Beckmann
2000; R. Pradhan and U. Pradhan 1996;).
Changing power and alliances. Though water
rights are constructed by legal orders, the
actualisation of water rights, both categorical and
concrete, are effected by social processes because
water rights are embedded in social, political and
economic relationships (F and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 2000). Adhikari and Pradhan (2000)
describe how in a river basin in Dang, with every
change in political regime in Nepal, a different set
of elites emerged who were able to control the
decision-making body that allocated water shares
and turns. The new political elites assigned to
themselves and their supporters more water shares
and better turns than they formerly enjoyed. In
Nepal, women, long denied rights to participate in
decision-making processes and to become
members of management committees of irrigation
systems, have lately acquired rights, even if only
categorical, to become members of committees and
to participate in meetings, thanks mainly to recent
state laws and the efforts of donor agencies and
NGOs.
Drinking water. Many religious doctrines and local
norms dictate that rights to domestic water
supplies, especially for drinking purposes,
overflow the narrow definitions of property
regimes. For example, according to Nepalese state
law valid until 1990, and which is still used as local
law in the villages, the proprietor of land on which
a spring or well is located has the right to exclude
other villagers from using the water source. The
landowner may appeal to state or a particular
version of local law to prohibit other villagers from
using the water, but social pressure and appeal to a
Hindu religious norm would force him to grant the
villagers use rights to the water source for domestic
purposes (Upreti 2000). However, despite religious
laws about granting access to drinking water for all,
low caste or low status households and individuals
may have difficulty in concretising their rights even
to drinking water.
These examples indicate that, as Hammoudi
(1985) observed, water rights are relational, that is,
they are relationships between people over water.
In other words, what one holds in one's hand is not
water but relations, relations which are often
hierarchical, fluid and transitory and subject to
change, just like the supply of water.
5 Conclusions
With every change in water supply from a water
source, introduction of new uses or users, change
in property regime, or social or political upheaval,
old rights holders and new claimants dispute and
negotiate and renegotiate their water rights
relationships. In the process of dispute and
negotiation, the claimants refer to different sets of
legal orders or different interpretations of the same
legal order to legitimise their claims. A single, rigid
rule for allocation and distribution of water is
unsuitable for taking into account the uncertainties
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in the quantities and timings of water supply for
multiple users and uses.
The fluid nature of water certainly enhances the
uncertainty and need for flexibility in dealing with
this resource, and the long history and intimate
connection between water and life have
contributed to the multiplicity of legal orders that
address who should have how much water, in what
places for what uses. Yet, the principles of legal
pluralism apply to other resources as well:
Instead of looking for clearly defined rules
within a single, coherent legal system, it is more
useful to recognise the ambiguity of rules and
the multiplicity of legal systems. This ambiguity
and pluralism gives scope for human agency,
through forum shopping and adapting rules in
the concretisation of rights. Such agency is
critical for dealing with uncertainties that arise
from environmental fluctuations, livelihood
changes, social and political upheavals, and
other sources.
Instead of trying to identify a single authority,
whether it be the state or formal user groups, it
is better to identify the overlapping and
polycentric forms of governance that influence
resource management. To enable institutions to
adapt to uncertainty, programmes seeking to set
up user groups to manage resources should
allow flexibility and adaptation in the organi-
ations, not seek to specify all the rules from the
outset.
At the same time, we should not assume that
local groups would be equitable or even have
sufficient technical knowledge to manage their
resources. We have seen many cases in which
power differences and social relations
obstructed the actualisation of rights, especially
for women or low-status groups. Externally
defined laws (from the government, projects, or
newly developed organisations) can provide
such disadvantaged groups with additional
bases for claiming property rights and increase
their bargaining power in negotiations for
resources. However, for this to be effective, new
laws aimed at strengthening the rights of the
poor or other marginal groups must be
accompanied by programmes to create
awareness by all parties, so that the new laws
can be cited and accepted in the negotiation
process.
In general, legal pluralism calls for greater humility
in policies and programmes. lt is not a matter of
getting the 'right' law or 'right' institution to
allocate or manage resources. Instead, rights to
resources will be determined through messy,
dynamic processes. Yet this also provides the scope
to respond to the uncertainties that resource users
face.
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